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QUESTIONING THE DEFINITION OF
“SEX” IN TITLE VII: BOSTOCK V.
CLAYTON COUNTY, GA
KATHERINE CARTER∗
INTRODUCTION
In October of 2019, the Supreme Court heard the arguments of two
cases presenting the same inquiry: whether Title VII’s prohibition on
sex discrimination encompasses discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.1 Currently, twenty-one states as well as the District of
Columbia expressly prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation by statute or regulation.2 Other states offer protection in
the form of agency interpretation or court ruling.3 However, for the
remaining states with no established protections, Title VII stands as the
only potential safeguard against sexual orientation discrimination.4
The following Commentary considers the case of Gerald Bostock,
a gay man from the state of Georgia who was fired from his job in 2013.5
The Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation, but Bostock appealed the
case and was granted certiorari. The Supreme Court consolidated this
case with Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda and allotted a single hour for
oral argument that took place on October 8, 2019.6 The Supreme Court
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1. Loren AliKhan, Symposium: A Trio of Cases, a Lot at Stake, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 9,
2019, 3:26 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/09/symposium-a-trio-of-cases-a-lot-at-stake/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Bostock v. Clayton County, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1618 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2019).
6. Gerald Lynn Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, FREEDOM FOR ALL AMERICANS,
https://www.freedomforallamericans.org/gerald-lynn-bostock-v-clayton-countygeorgia/#targetText=Gerald%20Lynn%20Bostock%20v.%20Clayton,argues%20applies%20to
%20sexual%20orientation (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda is a Second
Circuit case presenting the same issue. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir.
2018).
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is expected to come to a decision in the first half of 2020.7 The Court
will decide whether to expand the definition of the term “sex” in Title
VII to include sexual orientation, which is a desirable policy on its face.8
Discrimination in the workplace—based on anything other than work
performance—is not only archaic, but abhorrent. A redefinition of the
term “sex” would also help resolve the circuit court split on the issue.
However, these cases might instead push the Supreme Court to make
a more consequential decision, one stretching the bounds of
Constitutional separation of powers.9
I. FACTS
In 2003, Gerald Lynn Bostock began working for Clayton County,
Georgia, as the Child Welfare Services Coordinator assigned to the
Juvenile Court.10 Bostock was given primary responsibility for the
Court Appointed Special Advocates program (“CASA”) in which he
advocated for the interests of at-risk youth in the juvenile court
system.11 During his tenure, Bostock received favorable performance
reviews and Clayton County’s CASA program received the 2007
Program of Excellence Award from Georgia CASA.12 Furthermore,
Bostock was asked to serve on the National CASA Standards and
Policy Committee in both 2011 and 2012.13
Bostock identifies as gay and, in January 2013, he began
participating in a gay recreational softball league.14 Bostock claims that
during the following months, individuals with significant influence on
Clayton County’s decision making openly criticized Bostock’s
participation in the league as well as his sexual orientation.15 In April
2013, Clayton County initiated an audit of its CASA program funds,
which Bostock managed.16 Bostock claims the audit was unwarranted
and was prompted due to his sexual orientation and failure to conform

7. Id.
8. Andrée Blumstein, Symposium: How the Title VII Trilogy May Test the Court,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 5, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/09/symposium-howthe-title-vii-trilogy-may-test-the-court/.
9. Id.
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (June 26,
2019) (No. 17-1618) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Writ of Cert.].
11. Id.
12. Id. at 4–5.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
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to gender stereotypes.17 Bostock also asserts that members of the
Friends of Clayton County CASA Advisory Board disparaged his
sexual orientation and that his participation in the softball league was
criticized during one of their meetings.18
On June 3, 2013, Bostock was fired from his position as Child
Welfare Services Coordinator.19 Clayton County stated that Bostock
mismanaged CASA funds and thus terminated him for “conduct
unbecoming of a county employee.”20 Bostock now claims that his
termination was a result of discrimination based on “sex” in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 Clayton County contends
that, even if Bostock’s claim was true, Bostock has no actionable Title
VII claim because the statute does not extend to discrimination based
on sexual orientation.22
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Bostock filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. In return, the EEOC issued a “right to sue” letter, stating
he had a potentially legitimate discrimination claim.23 He then filed a
pro se action against Clayton County in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia.24 Clayton County moved
to dismiss the complaint on September 26, 2016.25 It argued Title VII
does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.26 The
County also argued the complaint did not adequately allege a claim of
gender stereotyping.27
On November 3, 2016, the magistrate judge recommended
dismissal on Bostock’s claim.28 The judge held that Title VII does not
cover claims of sexual orientation discrimination, applying Fifth Circuit
precedent set in Blum v. Gulf.29 The judge noted the EEOC now
17. Id.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 5–6.
21. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (Sept. 10, 2019)
(No. 17-1618) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner].
22. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 6–9,
23. Brief for Respondent at 3, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (Aug. 16, 2019)
(No. 17-1618) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 7–8.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id; Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Geographically,
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interprets Title VII to encompass sexual orientation discrimination, but
reasoned a district court should not defer to the EEOC’s
determinations over the precedent set by Blum.30 The judge also
recommended dismissal of Bostock’s gender stereotyping claim.31
Bostock objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, but
consideration of the case was deferred until the Eleventh Circuit issued
a decision in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital.32 The Eleventh
Circuit issued its decision on Evans on March 10, 2017,33 holding that
Blum remained binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit34 and that
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.35 In light of this, the district court dismissed Bostock’s
gender stereotyping claim and accordingly entered a judgment in favor
of Clayton County.36 Bostock appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.37
Bostock also filed a preliminary petition for rehearing en banc.38 The
Eleventh Circuit denied Bostock’s preliminary petition and affirmed
the district court’s decision.39
In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit looked to both Blum and Evans
as precedent, holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation.40 The court rejected Bostock’s argument
that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sundowner and Price Waterhouse
support Title VII claims for sexual orientation discrimination.41 The
Eleventh Circuit determined that its own precedent was too compelling
to agree with Bostock’s arguments, stating: “Our holding in Evans
forecloses Bostock’s claim. And under our prior panel precedent rule,

the Eleventh Circuit was originally part of the Fifth Circuit, but split off to form the Eleventh
Circuit effective October 1, 1981. For this reason, Fifth Circuit decisions from before this split are
considered binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.
30. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 6; Blum, 597 F.2d 936; Baldwin v. Foxx,
EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July 15, 2015).
31. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 7.
32. Id.; In Evans, the Eleventh Circuit considered the same issue, whether sexual orientation
discrimination was actionable under Title VII. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.
2017).
33. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1248.
34. Id. at 1255.
35. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id. at 6; Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 723 F. App’x 964, 964–65 (11th Cir.
2018) (denying preliminary petition for rehearing en banc).
40. Id.
41. Id; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).

BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY, GA.

2/24/2020 10:09 AM

63

we cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding, regardless of whether we
think it was wrong, unless an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh
Circuit en banc decision is issued.”42
However, there was not unanimity among the Eleventh Circuit
panel when they issued their decision.43 Judge Rosenbaum filed a
contemptuous dissent, arguing for the case to be reheard:44
The issue this case raises—whether Title VII protects gay and
lesbian individuals from discrimination because their sexual
preferences do not conform to their employers’ views of
whom individuals of their respective genders should love—is
indisputably en-banc-worthy. . . . I cannot explain why a
majority of our Court is content to rely on the precedential
equivalent of an Edsel with a missing engine, when it comes
to an issue that affects so many people.45
She scolded the court for clinging to aged precedent and argued that
the Eleventh Circuit was leaving a large portion of the population
vulnerable to sexual orientation discrimination. The court denied Judge
Rosenbaum’s plea to rehear the case.46
Bostock filed his petition for writ of certiorari on June 1, 2018.47 On
April 22, 2019, the Petition was granted.48
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Circuit Court Split
Prior to 2017, at least nine federal circuit courts had ruled that
sexual orientation is not covered under the term “sex” in Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.49 However, in the last few years, courts have
begun to split on the issue.50 In 2015, the EEOC started the shift in
interpretation with the Baldwin v. Foxx ruling, stating that Title VII

42. Bostock, 723 Fed. App’x. at 965.
43. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 894 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2018)
(Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1336.
45. Id. at 1336–37.
46. Id. at 1335.
47. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 5.
48. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (No. 17-1618).
49. Robert Iafolla, Supreme Court Can Settle Split on LGBT Bias in the Workplace,
BLOOMBERGLAW (Apr. 22, 2019, 9:54 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/supreme-court-can-settle-split-on-lgbt-bias-in-the-workplace.
50. Id.
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does apply to sexual orientation.51 Although the decision was not
binding precedent, it sparked a new wave of reinterpretation of the
term “sex” in Title VII.52
The first federal appeals court to reinterpret the meaning of “sex”
in Title VII was the Seventh Circuit in 2017.53 In Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit held in an 8-3
decision that workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation
violated Title VII.54 Hively was a landmark case, overturning Seventh
Circuit precedent.55 The Second Circuit quickly followed suit in 2018
with Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.56
In 2017, the Eleventh Circuit came to the opposite conclusion,
holding that sexual orientation discrimination was not covered under
Title VII.57 The court reasoned that “[b]ecause Congress has not made
sexual orientation a protected class, the appropriate venue for pressing
the argument raised by the Commission and the dissent is before
Congress, not this Court. And for decades, members of Congress have
introduced bills for that purpose.”58 The court refused to infringe on
what it believed to be Congress’s legislative power in deference to
precedent set forth in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.59
B. The Supreme Court and Gender-Stereotyping Distinction
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins that, when an employer relies on sex-based considerations or
takes gender into account when taking an employment-related action,
it violates Title VII.60 In Price Waterhouse, plaintiff Ann Hopkins sued
51. Id.
52. Erin Connell & Kathryn Mantoan, EEOC Rules that Sexual Orientation Discrimination
is Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, ORRICK (July 28, 2015), https://blogs.orrick.com/
employment/tag/baldwin-v-foxx/.
53. Iafolla, supra note 49; Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
54. Hively, 853 F.3d at 339.
55. Iafolla, supra note 49.
56. Id; Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
57. Litigation Tracker: Eleventh Circuit, FREEDOM FOR ALL AMERICANS,
https://www.freedomforallamericans.org/category/circuit-courts/eleventh-circuit/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2019); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l. Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017).
58. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261.
59. Id.; Litigation Tracker: Eleventh Circuit, supra note 57. Although Blum is a 1979 Fifth
Circuit holding, the Eleventh Circuit is bound by it because it was part of the Fifth Circuit until
1981.
60. Jenny Yang, Does the law protect the LGBTQ community from discrimination? It should
be an easy answer., WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/04/26/does-law-protect-lgbtq-community-discrimination-it-should-be-an-easyanswer/.
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her employer for sex-based discrimination after she was denied a
promotion to partnership.61 A statement considering her fitness for the
promotion contained various comments noting her poor interpersonal
skills and masculinity, as well as objections to her use of profanity as a
female.62 The Supreme Court held that Hopkins’ employer had made
an employment decision based on Hopkins’s failure to conform to
gender stereotypes, which constituted discrimination based on sex
under Title VII.63 Furthermore, the Court held that a Title VII pleading
does not require that gender be the “but-for” cause of an employment
decision.64 An employee must merely show that gender was a
motivating factor in an employment decision to have a colorable Title
VII claim.65 In 1991, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
Amendment, codifying this lesser causation standard.66
In the 1998 case Oncale v. Sundower, the Court unanimously agreed
that Title VII prohibits the entire spectrum of sex-based discrimination,
including same-sex harassment.67 The plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, brought
a Title VII claim against his employer after he quit his job due to
workplace harassment from a person of the same sex.68 The Court held
that Title VII’s protection against discrimination on the basis of sex
applies to both men and women, and there was no basis to support the
contention that Title VII categorically bars discrimination claims
“because of sex” when the employer and employee in question are
members of the same sex.
Even though the Supreme Court has been forced to interpret Title
VII on multiple occasions, it has never specifically determined whether
the term “sex” encompasses sexual orientation. However, Justice Scalia
did call for a common-sense approach in adjudicating Title VII cases,
requiring that the justices take into account “social context” when
making their decisions.69 In Sundower, Scalia wrote that “statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils.”70

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1989).
Id. at 234–35.
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 240–41.
Id. at 250.
Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 39.
Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
Id. at 76–77.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 79.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
Bostock’s argument that the Title VII definition of “sex” ought to
protects against discrimination based on sexual orientation is
segmented into three primary sections.71 First, the Petitioner looks to
the “plain language of Title VII,” arguing that sexual orientation
discrimination is a form of sex discrimination.72 Second, he argues that
the statutory history of Title VII and the Supreme Court’s historic
willingness to broadly interpret the term “sex” supports including
sexual orientation discrimination in Title VII.73 Lastly, the Petitioner
argues that, if the Supreme Court were to interpret Title VII to not
cover sexual orientation discrimination, it would create conflicts of
interpretation affecting various parts of the statute.74 For purposes of
this commentary, the following section considers only the first two
sections of the petitioner’s argument.
1. Statutory Interpretation: The Language of Title VII
The first portion of the Petitioner’s argument analyzes the statutory
language—specifically, the phrase “because of sex”—to determine its
scope.75 The Petitioner asserts that sexual orientation is necessarily a
sex-based classification.76 The dictionary definitions of the term
“homosexual” require reference to use of the term “sex.”77 The
Petitioner points to Webster’s Dictionary definition of “homosexual”
as “of, relating to, or characterized by a tendency to direct sexual desire
toward another of the same sex.”78 Petitioner contends the dictionary
definitions make it clear that sexual orientation cannot be defined or
determined without first taking an individual’s sex into account.79
Because the Price Waterhouse holding forbids employers from relying
on any sex-based considerations in making employment decisions, the
Petitioner reasons that the Court should similarly forbid sexual

71. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at iii-v.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Homosexual, Webster’s New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1961)). The
Petitioner uses the 1961 version of Webster’s Dictionary because this was the version used when
Title VII was drafted.
79. Id. at 13–14.
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orientation discrimination because it necessarily rests on a sex-based
consideration.80
The Petitioner then considers the Respondent’s likely
counterargument that homosexuality does not rest on a sex-based
consideration because sexual orientation is not “inextricably linked” to
sex.81 Both men and women can be homosexual, so the discrimination
is not truly class-based and thus is not actionable under Title VII.82 The
Petitioner rebuts this, relying on Price Waterhouse. In deciding Title VII
cases, the Supreme Court uses a classification-based, not a class-based,
approach, which focuses on fairness to individuals rather than disparate
treatment of classes.83 For instance, in Price Waterhouse, the Court held
that the employer’s action based on a belief that the female plaintiff
ought to wear jewelry was impermissibly sex-based.84 Discrimination
based on sexual-orientation qualifies as “discrimination ‘because of
sex,’ because an employer must consider the employee’s sex . . . [and
then in turn] treats the employee differently than it would if she or he
were the opposite sex.”85
Similarly, the Petitioner asserts that sexual orientation
discrimination is a form of associational sex discrimination, meaning
that the discrimination is derived from the employee’s association with
another person of the same sex.86 Associational discrimination was first
addressed by Congress in the 1960s as it pertained to race, but has
expanded to other contexts since then.87 Applied to the facts of this
case, this means that discrimination against a person because of the sex
of another person with whom they are associated is, in turn, to
discriminate against him because of his sex.88 Of the five circuit courts
to consider the issue, all have unanimously agreed that “the prohibition
on associational discrimination applies with equal force to all classes
protected by Title VII, including sex.”89 According to the Petitioner,
these cases provide guidance for the statutory interpretation in this

80. Id. at 14.
81. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 15–16.
83. Id. at 16. The Petitioner argues the Court focuses on fairness to individuals rather than
classes as a whole.
84. Id. at 17.
85. Id. at 17–18.
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 20.
89. Id. at 19. (citing Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 124 (2d Cir. 2018)).
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case.90 The cases’ logic points to the absence of a “principled reason
why the associational theory of discrimination should not also apply to
sex discrimination under Title VII.”91
Price Waterhouse established that sex stereotype discrimination is
unlawful, as it is “because of sex” discrimination under Title VII.92 The
Petitioner argues that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex
stereotype discrimination because sexual orientation discrimination
arises from a failure to conform to sex-based stereotypes.93 The
Petitioner also argues the Supreme Court’s consistent understanding of
sex as gender, which includes an individual’s conformity (or lack
thereof) with expected gender social roles, must necessarily protect
LGBTQ employees from discrimination under Title VII, given
identical existing protection for conformity (or lack thereof) with
expected gender roles.94 As the Second Circuit reasoned in Zarda, when
an employer acts on a belief that a female or male should not be
attracted to another female or male, respectively, the employer has
acted on the basis of gender.95 In Oncale, the court broadly interpreted
“because of sex” to encompass all forms of discrimination that
Congress might not have contemplated when it passed Title VII.96 This
logic applies just as forcefully to sexual orientation.97
2. The Statutory History of Title VII
The Petitioner begins this portion of his argument by noting that,
even in 1964, the Webster-Dictionary definition of “sex” included all
behavior between individuals, regardless of sexual orientation.98 Thus,
the Petitioner argues that the Civil Rights Act accordingly uses the
term “sex” to include more protection for all individuals regardless of
the gender of sexual partners.99 The Supreme Court has previously held
that statutory language is flexible in interpretation and scope as new
scenarios arise and old applications become anachronistic.100

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 19–20.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33 (citing West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 218 (1999)).
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Unlike the enumerated protections for race, color, religion, and
country of origin under Title VII, the “sex” class was a last-minute
addition, which leaves little legislative history to guide the Court in its
interpretation.101 However, Congress stated in 1972 that sex
discrimination was “no less serious than other prohibited forms of
discrimination, and that it is to be accorded the same degree of concern
given to any type of similarly unlawful conduct.”102 In 1978, Congress
took measures to extend the protections offered by Title VII by passing
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.103 The amendment made
discrimination against “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions” unlawful.104 The purpose of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act was to broaden the definition of sex discrimination
in Title VII to ensure that individuals are protected against all types of
employment discrimination based on sex.105
Congress passed this Act in response to the Supreme Court’s
narrow definition of “sex” under Title VII in General Electric v. Gilbert,
holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was permitted
even though only women can become pregnant.106 The Act indicated
that Congress itself intended the statutory ban on sex discrimination in
Title VII to be interpreted broadly to prevent discrimination due to any
sex-based classifications.107
After 1978, Congress left the Court to interpret the “because of sex”
clause with no further legislative clarification.108 The Supreme Court
ruled on a number of Title VII cases, including Price Waterhouse, in
which they broadly interpreted the “because of sex” provision.109 These
Title VII interpretations indicated that the clause was not limited to
forms of sex discrimination recognized at the time of its enactment—
that is, biological sex.110 In 1991, Congress confirmed and codified a
lessened causation standard for Title VII in the Civil Rights Act.111 This
standard provided that a violation of Title VII is shown by proof that
sex or another protected characteristic was a motivating factor for any
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 34.
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 7 (1971)).
Id. at 35.
Id. (citing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1978)).
Id. (citing S. REP NO. 95-331 at 2–3, H.R. REP. NO. 95-948 at 3–4).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 39.
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employment practice (even when considered with other legitimate,
unenumerated factors).112 The 1991 amendment passed without
changing the “because of sex” clause, indicating congressional approval
of the Supreme Court’s “motivating factor” doctrine.113
In 1998, the Supreme Court unanimously decided Oncale v.
Sundower Offshore Services, holding that the language of Title VII
extends beyond the types of discrimination that Congress considered
in 1964.114 Thus, Petitioner argues, Title VII encompasses sexual
orientation discrimination because it is described by the plain statutory
language and “there is no difficulty in interpreting the statute to reach
more broadly than Congress may have expected in 1964.”115
B. Respondent’s Arguments
The Respondent’s argument is segmented into five sections. For
purposes of this commentary, this section will only consider two of the
five arguments.116 First, the Respondent addresses the original public
understanding of “sex” as used in Title VII.117 Second, the Respondent
addresses the legislative developments that confirm that Title VII does
not include sexual orientation as a protected class.118
1. The 1964 Definition of “Sex”
The Respondent’s argument begins by addressing the original
meaning of “sex” as it was commonly understood when Title VII was
written in 1964, arguing that it prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex, but not sexual orientation.119 The Respondent notes that the Court
has repeatedly interpreted statutes applying their original public
meaning, stating that “words generally should be ‘interpreted as taking
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”120 The Respondent
argues that “contemporary” refers to the time in which the statute was
enacted, which is 1964 for the Civil Rights Act. This allows the public
to understand the legislation as Congress, not the courts, intended. The
Respondent states that the Petitioner’s argument that statutory

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 44 (citing Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)).
Id. at 45.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 23, at i-iv.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10 (quoting Wisc. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018)).
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language ought to be flexible only applies in scenarios when there has
been later statutory authorization to alter the interpretation of a
statute’s language.121
The Respondent continues by explaining that the 1964 ordinary
meaning of the term “sex” was biological sex, thus not covering sexual
orientation or homosexuality.122 As noted in the Petitioner’s brief, the
term “sex” was a last minute addition to Title VII, so there is little
legislative history to guide the Court’s interpretation of this term.123 In
the absence of such guidance, the Respondent reasons, returning to the
ordinary meaning of the term is appropriate.124 To do this, the
Respondent turns to the 1964 dictionary definition of the term and
compares it to the modern definition.125 The phrase “sexual
orientation” does not appear in either definition.126 The Respondent
states that the Petitioner’s attempt to include “behavior” as part of the
definition of the term is inappropriate, as the other enumerated
categories of Title VII protect certain characteristics, not behaviors.127
Thus, the Respondent argues, Title VII only prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of biological sex, not on the basis of sexual
orientation.128
2. Legislative Developments Regarding Title VII
The Respondent notes that Congress has repeatedly chosen not to
adopt proposed legislation that would have added sexual orientation
as a protected class under Title VII.129 Since 1974, there have been fifty
proposed bills in this category, including the Equality Act of 2019,
which has not yet passed the Senate.130 The Respondent refers to the
Petitioner’s argument that Congress has not amended Title VII to
include sexual orientation because it already includes sexual
orientation as a protected class as “preposterous,”131 because circuit
courts and the EEOC have held otherwise for decades.132 According to
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the Respondent, the number of bills introduced over the past forty-five
years seeking to amend Title VII to add sexual orientation as a
protected class demonstrate that Congress is aware that this class has
been left unprotected by Title VII.133
The Respondent further argues that by enacting the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Congress incorporated the decisions of the EEOC and
circuit courts holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.134 The Respondent states that Congress
incorporated the EEOC’s longstanding interpretation that Title VII
does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination by including the
same language as Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.135 The
Supreme Court has stated that if “a word or phrase has been . . . given
a uniform interpretation by inferior courts . . . a later version of that act
perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward in that
interpretation.”136 In 1991, every federal court of appeals to consider
the issue had held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.137 Thus, the Respondent reasons, the Court
ought to find that Congress carried forward prior judicial
interpretation of the term “sex” within Title VII when it used identical
language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.138
The Respondent points out that Congress has included sexual
orientation as a protected class in addition to sex or gender in various
civil rights statutes and other statutes enacted between 1998 and 2013,
such as the Violence Against Women Act. These recent statutes in
which Congress has specifically enumerated “sexual orientation” as a
protected class indicate Congress’s awareness and acknowledgment of
the distinction between “sex” and “sexual orientation.”139
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Historic Textualist v. Purposivist Approaches
Statutory interpretation has long been divided into two broad

133. Id. at 49–50.
134. Id. at 51.
135. Id. at 52.
136. Id. at 52 (citing Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 628, 633-34 (2019)).
137. Id. at 52–53.
138. Id. at 53–55.
139. Id. at 56–57.
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categories: textualism and purposivism.140 Purposivists appreciate the
“spirit rather than the letter of the law,” and approve of judicial
interpretation with the objective purpose of the legislature in mind.141
In contrast, textualists emphasize that judges should not give effect to
the un-enacted evidence of legislative purpose.142 Here, the only
language for the Court to interpret is the term “sex.” If you had asked
the Civil Rights Act drafters specifically whether they intended for the
term “sex” to encompass gender and sexual orientation discrimination,
they would likely be unaware why such a question was being posed.143
White women pushed for the term “sex” to even be included for their
own protection in the workplace.144 In 1964, LGBTQ rights and antidiscrimination measures were not contemplated by legislators. From a
textualist approach, this would mean that “sex” strictly means
biological sex. However, society has progressed to a point that the term
requires a much broader interpretation.
With no protection in place against sexual orientation
discrimination in the workplace in numerous states, the Supreme Court
should interpret “sex” to encompass sexual orientation. This would
require somewhat of a purposivist approach, but not one that requires
an unprecedented level of implied interpretation. The underlying
purpose of Title VII is to ban employer discrimination based on
anything other than work performance. In this particular case, Bostock
was an outstanding employee and his sexual orientation contributed to
his termination.145 He and other members of the LGBTQ community
deserve protection from unjust discrimination.
The Supreme Court already crossed the line into purposivist
interpretation in both Oncale and Price Waterhouse.146 In Price
Waterhouse, Title VII was found to protect against discrimination based
on a failure to conform to gender stereotypes.147 And, in Oncale, Title
VII was found to protect against the “entire spectrum” of sex-based
140. See John Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
70–111 (2006) (describing the differences between textualists and purposivists).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Garrett Epps, Why ‘Because of Sex’ Should Protect Gay People, THE ATLANTIC (Sept.
29, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/title-vii-should-protect-gay-people/
598825/.
144. Id.
145. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 4–6.
146. Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
147. Yang, supra note 60.
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discrimination.148 The Supreme Court has already given Title VII
meaning beyond the explicit language. This interpretation of “sex” to
include sexual orientation would align with the original purpose of Title
VII and give LGBTQ employees protection. As Justice Scalia wrote in
Oncale, and as the Petitioner points out, the Court must interpret Title
VII to prohibit some forms of sex discrimination that simply were not
considered in 1964.
Although the Respondent argues that the interpretations from
Price Waterhouse and Oncale still align with the 1964 definition of
“sex,” both parties seem to agree that cases of homosexuality and sex
stereotyping were likely not even considered in 1964, because the
protection against “sex” discrimination was a last-minute addition.
Interpreting “because of sex” to extend to sexual orientation does not
require an abrogation of its original definition; it merely requires an
extension of the definition to cover traits that are necessarily affiliated
with sex, such as sexual orientation. This strongly parallels the Supreme
Court’s logic in Price Waterhouse by construing “because of sex” to
cover sex stereotypes.
B. Policy Implications
The House of Representatives has recently found that, in the
absence of explicit laws against sexual orientation discrimination, there
is some level of uncertainty for employers.149 In response, the House
passed the Equality Act of 2019 to expand the definition of Title VII to
include sexual orientation within the meaning of sex.150 However, this
was too late for the number of LGBTQ employees who have already
experienced discrimination in the workplace due to their sexual
orientation. There is not a failure on Congress’ part to recognize that
LGBTQ employees deserve equal rights; as the Respondent notes,
there have been numerous proposed amendments to amend this
section of Title VII. However, there has been a failure by Congress to
act in time to provide appropriate legislative protection for these
individuals.
In an ideal world, Congress would have amended Title VII some
time ago instead of forcing the Supreme Court to interpret an older
piece of legislation that does not always appropriately apply to modern

148. Id.
149. Blumstein, supra note 8.
150. Id.
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social constructs. There are some circuit judges (and Supreme Court
justices) that feel some amount of discomfort in extending the
definition to include sexual orientation.151 However, to do nothing
would leave LGBTQ employees unprotected from discrimination for
an indefinite amount of time until Congress successfully passes a Title
VII amendment. Protection against discrimination seems to heavily
outweigh concerns regarding reinterpretation of Title VII, especially
since this current interpretation resulted from Congress’s inability to
address the issue at hand sooner.
The past two times that Congress successfully amended Title VII
both occurred after Title VII was interpreted by the Supreme Court.
Congress’s Pregnancy Discrimination Act reversed what Congress
believed to be an erroneous Supreme Court decision that allowed
discrimination against pregnant women, and the 1991 Civil Rights
Amendment codified a new causation standard that had already been
set forth by the Supreme Court.152 If the Supreme Court were to
interpret “because of sex,” in new way contrary to Congressional
intent, Congress still has the legislative power to reverse this decision
or codify the interpretation thereafter with another Civil Rights Act
amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the Supreme Court to rule in favor of Bostock, it would have to
broadly interpret the “because of sex” clause in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. Regardless of the outcome, this would resolve a current
circuit court split on whether the prohibition of discrimination based
on “sex” extends to discrimination based on an employee’s sexual
orientation. Further, if the Court rules for Bostock, it will provide
necessary protection for LGBTQ workers. There is valid concern that
this would be an overextension of the Supreme Court’s judicial power;
however, a clearer definition of the term “sex” would appropriately
protect against sexual orientation discrimination similar to the
interpretation of sexual stereotyping in Price Waterhouse.

151. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 723 F. App’x 964, 964–65 (11th Cir. 2018).
152. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 10, at 4 (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1978)).

